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decision logic. We have evaluated the proposed methodology of CPADS using the IEEE 39 bus system for 
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A Cyber-Physical Anomaly Detection for
Wide-Area Protection using Machine Learning
Vivek Kumar Singh, Member, IEEE, and Manimaran Govindarasu, Fellow, IEEE,
Abstract—Wide-area protection scheme (WAPS) provides
system-wide protection by detecting and mitigating small and
large-scale disturbances that are difficult to resolve using local
protection schemes. As this protection scheme is evolving from a
substation-based distributed remedial action scheme (DRAS) to
the control center-based centralized RAS (CRAS), it presents
severe challenges to their cybersecurity because of its heavy
reliance on an insecure grid communication, and its compro-
mise would lead to system failure. This paper presents an
architecture and methodology for developing a cyber-physical
anomaly detection system (CPADS) that utilizes synchrophasor
measurements and properties of network packets to detect data
integrity and communication failure attacks on measurement
and control signals in CRAS. The proposed machine leaning-
based methodology applies a rules-based approach to select
relevant input features, utilizes variational mode decomposition
(VMD) and decision tree (DT) algorithms to develop multiple
classification models, and performs final event identification using
a rules-based decision logic. We have evaluated the proposed
methodology of CPADS using the IEEE 39 bus system for
several performance measures (accuracy, recall, precision, and
F-measure) in a cyber-physical testbed environment. Our exper-
imental results reveal that the proposed algorithm (VMD-DT)
of CPADS outperforms the existing machine learning classifiers
during noisy and noise-free measurements while incurring an
acceptable processing overhead.
Index Terms—Wide-area protection, cybersecurity, syn-
chrophasor, machine learning, variational mode decomposition.
I. INTRODUCTION
TODAY’S electric power grid has transformed intoa highly complex and interconnected cyber-physical
system (CPS) and numerous controllers are operating at sub-
station and control center levels to maintain the stability and
reliability of power system. The significant growth in cyber
technologies to make the grid smarter has driven the energy
industry to a new era of reliability, sustainability, and effi-
ciency, which require a higher dependence on communication
infrastructure, data sharing devices, and sophisticated wide-
area controllers. While the emergence of CPS forms a core
modus operandi of the modern power grid, it has also rendered
the grid network increasingly vulnerable to numerous cyberat-
tacks [1], [2]. The past cybersecurity incidents, including the
Stuxnet Worm [3] and Ukraine grid hack [4] in 2015 and 2016,
have shown that the grid operation and physical infrastructures
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can be compromised due to cyberattacks—such as injecting
malware, data spoofing, denial of service (DoS) attack, etc.
Wide-area protection scheme (WAPS), also known as a
remedial action scheme (RAS) or special protection scheme
(SPS), is one of the critical wide-area protection and control
(WAPAC) applications that provides a system-wide protection
with optimized and coordinated control actions. Significant
efforts in the past have shown how the design and development
of RAS have shifted from a substation-based distributed to the
control center-based centralized protection scheme [5]-[8]. The
Southern California Edison (SCE) has developed a CRAS as
an optimized and economical solution over substation-based
local protection schemes to mitigate transmission line over-
loading while minimizing maintenance costs [7], [8]. Besides,
there has been a rapid shift in incorporating phasor measure-
ment unit (PMU) measurements to develop mission-critical
applications, such as CRAS based on the dynamic stability
assessment [6], [9], [10]. The authors of [6] discuss the emerg-
ing trends, design, and architecture of synchrophasor-based
WAPS for several applications, including frequency instability,
voltage instability, oscillation monitoring, thermal overloading,
and a combination of these applications. The North American
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) presents a response-
based CRAS, deployed in the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion (BPA)’s control center, which relies on synchrophasors
for wide-area stability and voltage control [9], [10].
A. Motivation
With the objective of pushing PMU applications from
mission-supportive to mission-critical, PMUs are increasingly
applied to develop WAPS. In [11], the authors proposed a
PMU-based CRAS for predicting catastrophic power system
events using ensemble decision trees. In [12], the authors
presented an artificial neural network (ANN)-based WAPS
for predicting and mitigating transient stability using PMU
measurements. In a similar context, the authors of [13] dis-
cussed an adaptive scheme based on transient energy analysis
and tested the proposed approach using the IEEE 39 bus
system. Although significant efforts, previous research [11]-
[13] assumed that the synchrophasor and SCADA networks
are secure and reliable and did not consider the cybersecurity
aspects associated with the grid services.
The current breakthrough solution—CRAS [8] is an ideal
target for attackers as its compromise would lead to a single
point of failure in control center-based protection function.
Since the CRAS is conventionally designed to mitigate power
system disturbances and not handle unexpected cyberattacks,
any unusual malfunction, triggered through cyberattacks, can
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affect the operational reliability and stability of the system.
Further, it relies heavily on insecure grid networks that is
exposed to countless cyberattacks. Some research efforts in
the past have shown how the critical application like WAPS
is subjected to stealthy cyberattacks [14]-[15]. In [14], the
authors discussed the vulnerability assessment of SCADA
communication protocols, and showed the impact analysis of
a coordinated cyberattack on the transient voltage stability in
RAS. The authors of [15] illustrated how the malware-initiated
stealthy and coordinated cyberattacks can severely impact
the system generator while targeting the RAS operation.
The existing literature [18]-[21] in the WAPAC cybersecurity
domain mostly addresses limited attack surfaces on either
measurement or control-signals. Therefore, it is imperative to
analyze cyberattack surfaces in spatial and temporal levels on
both measurements and control signals and eventually develop
a defense-in-depth architecture to enhance the resiliency of
CRAS against cyber threats. In our previous works, we have
performed the impact analysis of stealthy cyberattacks on
control signals [15] and illustrated how the decision tree (DT)
could be utilized in detecting malicious tripping attack in
CRAS [16].
B. Related Work
Over the recent decade, with the emergence of the smart
grid, researchers with different backgrounds have proposed
various types of anomaly detection systems (ADS), in-
cluding model-based, multi-agent, protocol-specific, and ma-
chine learning-based ADS for the cyber-physical security of
WAPAC. In [17], the authors proposed a model-based ADS for
detecting data integrity attacks on measurement signals in the
automatic generation control (AGC); however, the proposed
method may fail to detect multi-layer stealthy anomalies on
measurement and control signals. Also, applying redundant
measurements, such as load forecast to detect anomalies is
unfit in CRAS as the forecast error may amplify during the
unplanned outages [18]. The authors of [19] and [20] presented
a multi-agent-based ADS to detect cyberattacks while focusing
on local protection scheme and DRAS. In [21]-[23], the
authors discussed a specification-based ADS for supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) and synchrophasor
communication protocols. Although the proposed signature-
based ADSs perform well in detecting anomalies using net-
work packet logs, they require an intensive knowledge of
communication protocols for developing rules; and hence not
appropriate for the big-data problem. Further, they may fail
to detect physical disturbances, such as line faults, making it
unfit for the CRAS cybersecurity.
Several research efforts [24]-[26] have shown the applica-
tion of machine learning and data mining techniques in de-
veloping the ADS for wide-area monitoring system (WAMS),
including frequency, voltage, and power oscillation monitor-
ing while considering anomalies on incoming measurement
signals. Pan et al. presented a common path mining-based
ADS to classify cyberattacks, normal operations, and physical
disturbances using synchrophasor measurements and audit
logs and tested the proposed method on a smaller three-
bus two-line transmission system [27]. However, the applied
common path mining method requires human efforts and lacks
fast detection with limited applications. Since the accuracy of
machine learning classifiers depends on input features, several
techniques have been proposed to select relevant features for
the accurate classification of different events. The authors of
[28]-[30] presented how system parameters, such as voltage,
current, frequency, and their computed derivative features
could be utilized in developing decision tree-based efficient
classifiers for detecting power system events. Cyber-physical
events in power systems create different flavors of transient
phenomena that can be detected using the computed derivative
features from raw PMU data.
Recently, a novel signal decomposition technique, called
variational mode decomposition (VMD) [31], is introduced
that decomposes a multi-component signal into the set of sub-
signal modes. Previous research efforts have demonstrated its
application in performing multi-level classifications [31], [32]
and illustrated its superior performance compared to the con-
ventional empirical mode decomposition (EMD) technique;
however, they provide very little insight or discussion related
to its application in the CRAS cybersecurity. Recently, the
authors of [33] discussed how the VMD technique could be
applied to detect false data injection attack (FDI) in the state
estimation; however, the proposed method is not applicable
in detecting other types of attacks, such as communication
failure attacks and coordinated attacks. Motivated by its ex-
cellent capability to extract relevant features and the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work that applies the VMD
technique to develop a CPADS that characterizes different
types of events, including cyberattacks, physical disturbances,
and normal operation in the context of synchrophasor-based
WAPS. Also, there has been no prior work in detecting
coordinated cyberattacks in CRAS cybersecurity.
C. Contribution
The key contributions of this paper include:
1) Novel architecture and methodology are proposed for
developing the CPADS by leveraging PMU measurements
and network packet properties and applying VMD and DT
algorithms.
2) Rules-based feature selection method is proposed by
applying the filter and wrapper methods to obtain relevant
features for machine learning-based classifiers.
3) A detailed performance analysis, during both cyber
and physical events, in a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) cyber-
physical security testbed environment is presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents a brief overview of different cyberattacks and intro-
duces the problem formulation in CRAS cybersecurity. The
proposed architecture and machine learning-based method-
ology are presented in Section III. Section IV and Section
V present a case study and experimental evaluation of the
proposed algorithm on IEEE 39 bus system. Section VI
provides the conclusions of our paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Overview of CRAS
In this work, we have considered a combined event and
parameter-based CRAS, as shown in Fig. 1, where the CRAS
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controller (CRASc), operating at the control center, receives
phasor measurements of critical lines and generators from
different substation zones through synchrophasor network and
later performs corrective actions like generation shedding, as
defined in the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) guideline [34], by sending control signals through the
SCADA communication. The complete operation of CRAS is
divided into four major steps.
Step 1: The CRASc, initially at an armed stage, collects
phasor data at a regular interval in terms of relays status, power
line flows, and generator power output of substation zones.
Step 2: The CRASc gets triggered during a line outage and
checks the operational transfer capability (OTC) limit of other
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Fig. 1: Flowchart of CRAS and its cyberattack surface
Step 3: If current line flows exceed their maximum
operational transfer capability (OTC max) limits, the CRASc
curtails the generation to prevent the thermal overloading in
other adjacent critical lines. Note that the thermal overload
limit is considered while computing the OTC max limits,
which is provided through a predefined action table based on
offline contingency analysis of substation zones.
Step 4: Also, the CRASc restores the generation once a
fault or line contingency is cleared [34].
B. Cyber and Physical Events
1) Cyber Events
Based on possible attack surfaces on measurement and
control signals, as highlighted by lightning bolt symbols in
Fig. 1, we have considered following types of cyberattacks.
a) Generation altering attack: Modification of a control
signal to unnecessarily alter the generation. In particular, we
have considered two attack templates: pulse and ramp attacks
[17], to perform this attack.
Pulse attack: It involves periodically changing an input
control signal by adding the pulse attack parameter, λpulse,
for a small time interval, (t1). It retains the original input for
a remaining interval, (T − t1), for the given time period, (T ),
as shown in (1).
Ramp attack: It involves adding a time-varying ramp signal
to the input control signal based on a ramp signal parameter,
λramp, as shown in (2).
Ppulse =
{
Pi(1 + λpulse)(t = t1)
Pi(t = T − t1)
(1)
Pramp = Pi + λramp ∗ t (2)
b) Malicious tripping attack: Unauthorized tripping of a
relay, also known as an intelligent electronic device (IED),
by launching a trip command using SCADA protocols to
disconnect the transmission line.
c) False-data-injection (FDI) attack: Injecting malicious
phasor measurements, disguised as genuine measurements, by
successfully conducting a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
over the network to provide an incorrect situational awareness
to the CRASc.
d) Denial of Service (DoS) attack: Performing a SYN flood
attack by repeatedly sending the SYN packets on the targeted
substation-based data aggregator to disrupt the synchrophasor
communication between substation and control center.
e) Coordinated cyberattack: Combination of attack vectors
on measurement and control signals where deceptive phasor
measurement signals are injected before modifying control
signals to nullify the operation of CRASc. In this category,
three attacks are considered: 1) FDI attack followed by a
malicious tripping attack, 2) FDI attack followed by a pulse
attack, 3) FDI attack followed by a ramp attack.
2) Physical Events
Apart from cyberattacks, we have also considered several
natural/man-made line faults at the power system layer. It
includes symmetrical and asymmetrical line faults that can
happen on transmission lines.
C. Assumptions
The smart grid consists of several substations that rely
on several legacy devices and SCADA and synchrophasor
communication protocols to facilitate the CRAS operation.
Since these communication protocols, including Distributed
Network Protocol (DNP3), IEC 61850, IEEE C37.118, etc.
are generally not encrypted, there are numerous possible
ways of performing cyberattacks despite the existing defense
mechanisms, such as firewall, virtual private network (VPN),
and NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards.
Further, the substation-based remote terminal units (RTUs) and
local phasor data concentrators (PDCs) are mostly embedded
devices and do not provide enough computational power and
functionality to support authentication and protocol encryp-
tion. The National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organiza-
tion Resource (NESCOR) group [35] discussed the existing
vulnerabilities in communication protocols and devices in
the WAMPAC cybersecurity. From a real-world perspective,
it is extremely difficult for an attacker to get unauthorized
access to several substation zones at the same time when
these zones are geographically dispersed; and are operating
in a secure environment. From the attack side, we assume
that the attacker has access to one of the substation zones;
and can compromise and manipulate measurement or control
signals for that specific zone to perform single and coordinated
cyberattacks.
D. Problem Statement
The main goal of this research is to develop a real-time
CPADS for the CRAS by utilizing data-driven algorithms,
PMU measurements, and cyber properties (network packets)
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to detect anomalies and provide a detailed classification of
cyberattacks and power system disturbances. In this work,
different classes of attacks are considered to develop a robust
and efficient CPADS. Based on the stated assumptions and the
existing attack surfaces, the proposed algorithm should be able
to achieve a high detection accuracy with acceptable latency
bounds while supporting scalability to large grid networks and
applying to a wide range of CRAS configurations. Further, the
proposed CPADS will assist in developing effective mitigation
strategies tailored to these events to restore the normal grid
operation after disturbances.
III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE AND METHODOLOGY
A. Proposed Architecture
Fig. 2 shows the proposed architecture of CPADS for the
CRAS that consists of multiple anomaly detectors (Anomaly
detector A...Anomaly Detector N) that are operating at the
secure control center. To facilitate the accurate and reliable
operations of CRAS, the whole power system is divided into
several substation zones as Zone A...Zone N. For different
buses in the interconnected grid, system dynamics and magni-
tude of disturbances could be very different and a “one size fits
all” solution is not suitable for accurately detecting attacks.
Therefore, we are proposing multiple anomaly detectors-based
CPADS, where an individual anomaly detector is dedicated
to the specific substation zone that oversees a few critical
substations and detects possible cyber intrusions in that zone.
Note that the operation of each anomaly detector is not
dependent on other anomaly detectors for detecting attacks
in the assigned zone, and it eventually assists CRASc in
taking appropriate corrective actions. Further, the proposed
architecture receives three different types of data sources as
an input data that are discussed here.
Zone A 
Zone N   
measurements


















local RTU Nlocal PDC N
MW/ MVAR 
Control
local PDC Alocal RTU A








Centralized Remedial Action 
Scheme Controller (CRASc) 
Fig. 2: Proposed architecture of CPADS with CRAS
1) Input data
While assuming total substation zones N , the proposed
anomaly detector (i.e. anomaly detector A), operating for the
substation zone A, receives raw input data as time-stamped
Ns samples of PMU data points Xa that consists of a set of
local PMU measurements Xla, PMU network properties Cla,
and redundant PMU measurements Xra from the remaining








Xla = [V ga, Fga, (V1a, V2a, V0a)i, (V1a, V2a, V0a)j ] (4)
Cla = [ska, tka] (5)
a) Local PMU measurements (Xla): Consist of a positive
sequence generation bus voltage (V ga), generator frequency
(Fga), and positive, negative, and zero sequence components
((V1a, V2a, V0a)i, (V1a, V2a, V0a)j) of bus voltages at sending
and receiving ends of critical transmission lines, as denoted by
subscripts i and j in (4). These measurements are collected
from deployed PMUs in the substation zone A during a regular
operation of CRAS.
b) PMU Network Properties (Cla): Include packet size
ska with a timestamp tka of incoming synchrophasor network
packets from the substation zone A at the instant (k), as
represented in (5).
c) Redundant PMU measurements (Xra): Consist of a
same category of PMU measurements ((Xra) of other substa-
tion zones N -a that are forwarded to the anomaly detector A
through the control center-based data aggregator.
Note that the proposed multi-source input data is based
on the notion that the injected disturbances at one node are
propagated to other adjacent and connected nodes in a well-
coordinated way that can be utilized for detecting different
classes of cyberattacks.
B. Proposed Methodology
Fig. 3 illustrates the proposed methodology of each anomaly
detector (i.e. anomaly detector A) that receives Xa to perform
multi-events classification using three classification models:
model 1 (M1), model 2 (M2), and model 3 (M3). These three
classifiers receive different sets of input features, as shown in
Fig. 3, and the output of these classifiers are utilized to perform
final events identification using a rules-based decision logic.
The mechanism for developing this methodology consists of
three phases: 1) offline process for developing, training, and
updating classification models with new scenarios or cases
when models are not online, 2) online process for comput-
ing and extracting relevant features, and testing classification
models, and 3) rules-based decision logic for final events
identification.
1) Offline Process
The offline process, common for all three classification
models, consists of three different modules that are elaborated
in greater detail below.
Step 1 (Labeled dataset generation module): In this module,
a library of the training dataset is generated through a HIL real-
time simulation of several cyber-physical scenarios, including
cyberattacks and line faults while assigning class labels. The
modeled system is characterized by generators capacity, load
levels, system topology, etc., to generate a library of training
datasets Lm = (U, V )m of L samples for a classification
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Fig. 3: Proposed methodology of an anomaly detector
model m, where U=[f1, f2, ...fp] is a set of p features and
V is a set of labels corresponding to U.
Step 2 (Data pre-processing module): This module includes
data cleaning, normalization, and rules-based features selec-
tion to eliminate weakly and irrelevant features that may affect
the performance of classification models.
a) Data cleaning and normalization: Data cleaning pro-
vides quality assessment by filtering inconsistent values and
eliminating rows with missing data. Data normalization scales
Lm to a normalized dataset L′m such that samples of each
input feature fi[j]Zj=1 i ∈ {1, P} lie in the range [0 1], which
enhances smoothness and improves homogeneity among sam-
ples.
b) Rules-based features selection: Selection of optimal
features requires an expert knowledge and detailed investi-
gation of L′m. Based on the nature of classification models,
a combination of filter and wrapper-based feature selection
approaches is proposed to obtain necessary features. In par-
ticular, best first search (BFS) algorithm, one of the wrapper
methods, is utilized to select relevant features from U that are
weakly correlated among them and strongly correlated to V in
a forward selection process [35]. Also, Pearson’s correlation
coefficient (Pc) technique, one of the filter methods, is applied
to quantify the degree of correlation among features in U.
For a given two input features fi and fj ([fi, fj] ∈U), it
is computed using (6) where cov(fi, fj) is the covariance,





In particular, we have defined two rules to select relevant
features for M1, M2, and M3 that are explained for the
anomaly detector A.
Rule 1: For M1 that receives Xa category of input data,
the relevant features are selected in two stages. The first stage
involves separately selecting independent and weakly corre-
lated features in intra-substation zone measurements, which
are substation zone A measurements ([Xla, Cla]) and Xra
from N -A substation zones, by applying the BFS algorithm.
In the second stage, the previously selected features of Xla
and Xra are again filtered by applying Pc for selecting final
features that exhibit medium to high inter-substation zones
correlation (±0.75 to ± 1) between the selected features of
substation zone A and substation zones N -A. This two-stage
selection process is based on the notion that the electrically-
close PMU measurements from N -A substation zones can
be utilized to detect FDI attacks on local measurements of
substation zone A.
Rule 2: For M2 and M3, the BFS algorithm is applied to
select independent features in U that are weakly correlated
among them while exhibiting a high correlation to V.
Step 3 (Training module): In this module, the obtained
datasets L′′m of previously selected features are used as inputs
for training a random decision tree (DT)-based classifiers in
M1, M2, and M3. The DT generates a tree-like structure by
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repeatedly splitting L′′m into small and optimal subsets until
each partition contains only samples of one class label. The
generated decision tree rules after training of M1, M2, and M3
are applied later for online testing during event classifications.
2) Online Process
This process consists of computing derived features, VMD-
based features extraction and normalization, testing trained
classification models, and applying rules-based decision logic
for identifying events.
Step 1 (Derived features computation): From the power
system’s perspective, the injected transient disturbances during
data integrity (cyber) attacks and natural/man-made physi-
cal events, such as line-faults may look similar; however,
these events leave a unique signature on raw PMU measure-
ments that can be extracted by computing derived features
(attributes). Therefore, we have computed derived features
([Xla’, Cla’]) from local measurements ([Xla, Cla]) where
Xl
′
a=[|Xla|2,∆Xla, dXladt ] is computed from Xla, as shown
in (7) to (9). |Xla|2 is a square of phasors magnitude, ∆Xla
includes a change in generator bus voltage ∆V ga and fre-
quency ∆Fga, and difference in symmetrical components of
sending and receiving ends of line voltage ∆[V1a, V2a, V0a]ij ,
and dXladt are their respective derivatives.
|Xla|2 = [|V ga|2, |Fga|2, [|V120a|]2i , [|V120a|]2j ] (7)















From Cla, four features are computed using (10) to (12)
where the first two features of Cl′a include moving average
(M(∆ska), M(∆tka)) of change in packet size (∆ska) and
timing difference between two consecutive packets (∆tka)
and the remaining two features are their standard deviations
(S(∆ska),S(∆tka)). A sliding window l=10 is considered
while computing these features.
Cl
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Step 2 (VMD-based features extraction): The VMD tech-
nique is applied to extract distinctive features by decomposing
a multi-component signal u(t) into a set of sub-signal modes
uk(t), also known as band-limited intrinsic mode functions
(IMFs) with the specific sparsity properties [31]. The resulting












k=1 uk = f
where wk is the estimated center frequency around which
the kth decomposed mode uk is mostly compact. A vmd
function is defined to calculate K decomposed modes,
{mode1,mode2...modeK}={u1. . . uK} from Ns samples as
{u1, u2, ..uK} = vmd(u(t), α,K, Tol) (14)
where α is a bandwidth constraint, u(t) ∈ (Xl′a, Xra), K is
a mode count, and Tol is a convergence tolerance level.
In this work, α is set to a lower value (α=200) to cap-
ture a wide range of frequency contents in u(t). Since K
decides the total decomposed modes, its value is assigned to
4 (K=4), similar to the total labeled classes in each model,
and Tol=10−7. The computed modes Ula from Xl′a and Ura
from Xra with Cl′a are utilized later for generating a library of
labeled datasets (U ∈ [Ula, Ura, Cl′a]), applying rules-based
features selection, and training and building classification
models through the offline process as discussed earlier.
The overall detection algorithm is summarized here.
Algorithm 1: Proposed Anomaly Detection Algorithm
Input: Xla, Cla, Xra
Output: O
1 Parameters: l, K, Tol, α, m;
2 Initialization: set l=10, K=4, α=200, Tol=10−7,m=0
3 while t≥to do
4 Compute Xl′a from Xla and Cl
′
a from Cla
5 Apply vmd and compute Ula & Ura
6 m=m+1
7 if m=1 then
8 Generate L1 datasets & compute L′1 & L
′′
1
9 Train VMD-DT1(Ula, Ura, Cl′a) using L
′′
1
10 Output events Z (z1, z2, z3)
11 else if m=2 then
12 Generate L2 datasets & compute L′2 & L
′′
2
13 Train VMD-DT2(Ula, Ura) using L′′2
14 Output events W (w1, w2, w3, w4, w5)
15 else if m=3 then
16 Generate L3 datasets & compute L′3 & L
′′
3
17 Train VMD-DT3(Ura) using L′′3
18 Output events Y (y1, y2, y3, y4)
19 while Z=z1 do
20 O=W ; Output events to the CRASc
21 else if Z 6=z1 then
22 O=Y ; Output events to the CRASc
Step 3 (Classification models testing): In this process, three
supervised classification models: M1, M2, and M3 perform
independent predictions of events as discussed here.
M1 anomaly detector: This model VMD-DT1(Ula, Ura,
Cl
′
a) receives Ula, Ura, and Cl
′
a categories of measurements,
selects relevant features from L′1 using rule 1, performs offline
training using L′′1 datasets, and returns a set of class labels Z
(z1, z2, z3), where z1 represents a normal event, z2 and z3
are FDI and DoS attacks.
M2 anomaly detector: This model VMD-DT2(Ula, Ura)
receives Ula and Ura categories of measurements, selects
relevant features from L′2 using rule 2, performs offline
training using L′′2 datasets, and returns a set of class labels W
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(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5), where w1 represents a normal event,
w2 represents line faults, w3 represents a malicious tripping
attack, w4 and w5 are pulse and ramp attacks.
M3 anomaly detector: This model VMD-DT3(Ura) re-
ceives only Ura category of measurements, selects relevant
features from L′3 using rule 2, performs offline training using
L′′3 datasets, and returns a set of class labels Y (y1, y2, y3,
y4), where y1 is a normal event, y2 represents a malicious
tripping attack, y3 and y4 are pulse and ramp attacks.
3) Rules-based Decision Logic
This final phase receives class labels Z, W, and Y from
M1, M2, and M3 and provides final cyber-physical events
classification O, including normal operation, line faults, single,
and coordinated cyberattacks based on the defined two rules-
based logic.
Rule 1: If Z = z1 (normal event) in M1, then W of M2
is forwarded to the CRASc (i.e. O=W ), and Y of M3 is
discarded to detect faults and single cyberattacks using M1
accurately.
Rule 2: If Z = z2 or z3 in M1, then Y of M3 is forwarded
to the CRASc (i.e. O=Y ) and W is discarded as the Xla
of substation zone A are either compromised or unavailable
due to FDI or DoS attacks, and coordinated cyberattacks are























































Fig. 4: IEEE 39 bus with PMU-based CRAS
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. System Topology and Experimental Setup
Fig. 4 shows the modified IEEE 39 system that is divided
into three major zones: zone 1, zone 2, and zone 3. Based on
the offline contingency analysis, we have deployed a CRASc
to prevent the thermal overload during single-line outages in
different zones. For zone 1 operation, the CRASc receives
PMU data of line buses 15, 16, and 17, and generator bus
35, to monitor disturbances, especially a single line outage.
During the tripping of line L16-17, the CRASc is activated
TABLE I: Datasets for training and testing models
Scenarios Cases
Physical Disturbances




0.3, 0.5, 0.7 4.8, 6, 7.2 270
Symmetrical
L-L-L (A-B-C), LLL-G (ABC-G) 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 4.8, 6. 7.2 180
Single cyberattacks
Malicious Tripping Line = L16-17 10
Pulse Attacks Duty=[0.3, 0.5, 0.8], Period=[-2, -2.5, -3, -3.5] 120
Ramp Attacks Ramping Steps/sec = [2, 3, 4, 5] 40




MITM (FDI) + Malicious Tripping Line = L16-17 10
MITM (FDI) + Pulse Attacks Duty=[0.3, 0.5, 0.8], Period=[2, 2.5, 3, 3.5] 120
MITM (FDI) + Ramp Attacks Steps = [2, 3, 4, 5] 40
and sheds the generation at bus 35 to maintain the power flow
limits and prevent overloading in line L15-16. In addition, the
CRASc also receives phasor measurements of line buses 26,
28, and 29 and generator bus 38 for the zone 2; and line buses
11, 6, 13, and 14 and generator bus 32 for the zone 3, to detect
disturbances and provide an appropriate generation shedding
in their respective zones.
To validate the proposed approach, the anomaly detector for
zone 1 (i.e. anomaly detector 1) is tested and evaluated in the
HIL cyber-physical testbed environment, as shown in Fig. 5.
The selected IEEE 39 bus system is modeled in ARTEMiS-
SSN (State-Space Nodal) solver in eMEGASIM (RT-Lab)
environment and simulated using OP5600 OPAL-RT real-time
digital simulator at a smaller time step of 50 µs. The simulator
is mapped to two physical (SEL-421) relays through the IEC
61850-8-1 GOOSE communication message to enable circuit
breakers for lines L15-16 and L16-17, as relay 1 and relay
2. Further the modeled virtual PMUs, inside the simulator,
are sending phasor measurements at a sampling rate of 60
frames/second to two SEL-3573 local PDCs, where LPDC1
operates as a local PDC for the substation zone 1 and LPDC23
operates as a local PDC for the substation zone 2 and zone
3. The control center-based central PDC (OpenPDC) receives
data from local PDCs and stores it in a historian comma-
separated values (CSV) files and MySQL database. We have
utilized the Wireshark tool, an open-source network analyzer,
to monitor network traffic and store network logs in the CSV
files. The CRASc periodically polls the data from the MySQL
database in real-time, and provides necessary SCADA-based
control signals to the simulator through a substation RTU
using the Kepserver’s OPC Unified Architecture (UA) client-
server interface to close the loop. For developing classification
models using the stored CSV files, we have applied the
WEKA, an open-source machine learning platform, which
supports several supervised machine learning algorithms that
can be utilized for developing classifiers.
B. Labeled Datasets Preparation
Table I presents a list of several cases with different sce-
narios that we have considered for generating datasets through
the tesbed-based experiments. While simulating physical line
faults, we have considered asymmetrical and symmetrical line
faults on Line L16-17 for three fault locations (0.3, 0.5 and
0.7 p.u.) and three fault durations (4.8, 6, 7.2 cycles) followed
by the normal tripping of line for different operating points.
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Fig. 5: HIL experimental setup for attack-detection experiment
Note that we have varied the generation at bus 35 from 610
MW to 700 MW and the load at bus 18 from 118 MW to
208 MW in a step increase of 10 MW to create 10 operating
points while maintaining the generation-load balance.
For performing single cyberattacks in zone 1, we have con-
sidered four attacks; malicious tripping, pulse, ramp, and DoS
attacks, at different operating points. During the malicious
tripping attack, a single line outage (L16-17) is considered
for different operating points. During pulse attack, we have
considered three duty cycles (t1/T = [0.3, 0.5, 0.8]) and four
time periods (T = [2, 2.5, 3, 3.5]) with λpulse = -0.8. In case of
ramp attack, four negative ramping steps/sec, λramp = [-2, -3,
-4, -5], are considered to gradually reduce the generation at bus
35 for different operating points. During the SYN flooding-
based DoS attack, packets number and size are varied from
(3000, 350) to (11000, 1150) in a step increase of 1000 packet
numbers and 100 packet size to create 90 cases.
During the coordinated cyberattacks, we have considered
three attack vectors, where a MITM attack is performed on
phasor measurement signals of the zone 1 followed by attacks,
including malicious tripping, ramp, and pulse attacks, on
control signals for the same number of scenarios, as mentioned
in the single cyberattacks. In total, we have considered 880
cases of cyber-physical events; where 450 cases are simulated
line faults, 260 are single attacks, and the remaining 170 cases
represent coordinated cyberattacks.
C. Testbed-based Implementation
Fig. 5 also presents the experimental setup for implement-
ing cyberattacks and generating heterogeneous datasets, as
necessary for training and testing classification models. The
malicious tripping attack is performed on the relay 2 by
replaying the tripping packet, captured during the normal
tripping operation, using a python script between the substa-
tion and control center, as shown by yellow triangular box
1. The DoS attack is performed to break the synchrophasor
communication between LPDC1 and OpenPDC, as shown
by yellow triangular box 2. It is implemented by sending
a huge number of random packets to the LPDC1 through
the TCP SYN flooding attack using hping tool, available in
the Kali Linux machine. For deploying generation altering
attacks, including ramp and pulse attacks, on the generator
35 (G35), the malware installation-based attack is performed
by installing the malware, Trojan Horse, on the OPC server-
based substation RTU, as shown by yellow triangular box 3.
The installed malware provides a backdoor access to close
the legitimate RTU program and initiate python script-based
malicious logic that periodically sends malicious control signal
to initiate ramp and pulse attacks on the generator (G35).
To perform coordinated cyberattacks, we have performed
a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack, as a FDI attack vector,
between the LPDC1 and control center-based OpenPDC, as
shown by yellow triangular box 4, followed by malicious
tripping, ramp, and pulse attacks. For performing the MITM
attack, an address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing attack
is implemented using a Kali Linux machine to poison the
ARP cache table. Later, the Linux-based PMU simulator tool,
PMUSim, masquerading as a legitimate PMU, sends malicious
phasor measurements to the OpenPDC [36]. The malicious
PMU measurements include replaying last 60 samples of
PMU data captured during the normal operation using the
Wireshark. For simulating physical disturbances, including
symmetrical and asymmetrical line faults, we have utilized
the Python-based application programming interface (API) of
the simulator to perform automated and multiple simulations
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Fig. 6: Rules-based features selection for classification models
(M1, M2, & M3) for an anomaly detector 1
D. Features Extraction and Training Models
During the offline process, several relevant features are se-
lected by applying the proposed rules-based features selection
approach for classification models M1, M2, & M3 of the
anomaly detector 1. Fig. 6 illustrates this selection approach
using the ball-and-stick diagram where colored balls (orange,
sky blue, and green) represent the local PDCs of zone 1, zone
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Fig. 7: VMD application for features extraction
2, and zone 3, a grey colored ball shows the log monitor
(LM 1) of zone 1, and arrow illustrates the total number
of features that are received by classification models before
and after the selection process. These classification models
are represented by non-colored balls in Fig. 6. Initially, 268
features for M1, 264 features for M2, and 96 features for
M3 are considered for the classification process; however,
after applying the rules-based features selection process, 51
features for M1, 30 features for M2, and 24 features for
M3 actually participate in training these models. Further, the
proposed selection technique is investigated for classification
accuracy that reveals an increment in an accurate rate of 0.4%,
0.04%, and 0.45% in M1, M2, and M3. Note that while
training these models, the selected system was simulated for 5
seconds to capture the system dynamics for each scenario that
corresponds to 300 samples (60 samples/second) per scenario.
These 300 samples of data were selected from a time instant
when an event has initiated. Once the heterogeneous database
is generated, 70% of the data is utilized for training models
and the remaining 30% is utilized for testing models. Since
we are interested in characterizing different events based on
the deviation from the nominal value in a small-time frame,
irrespective of the shape of a signal curve, we process the
obtained VMD-based decomposed modes at each time step
independent from the previous time step, and feed into the
decision tree-based models to perform multi-classification.
E. VMD Application on Time-Series Data
Fig. 7 presents an illustrative example that walks through the
application of VMD algorithm to validate its effectiveness in
extracting features for detecting anomalies. For a sample case
study, the positive sequence voltage angle difference (Va16-17)
between the bus 16 and bus 17 of IEEE 39 bus system, one of
the selected derived features, is decomposed into four modes
with different frequencies using VMD technique. Fig. 7 (a)
and Fig. 7 (b) represent original input signals during pulse and
ramp attacks on generator 35. During the pulse attack, the low-
frequency transient is extracted in the first mode (mode 1) that
provides the rough estimation of states, and medium and high
(impulsive) frequency components are separately extracted in
the second (mode 2), third (mode 3), and forth mode (mode
4). Since ramp attack gradually changes system dynamics, the
first mode effectively estimates the input signal. In contrast,
the computed medium and higher modes in ramp attack do not
exhibit any frequency oscillation as compared to pulse attack.
The above observations signify the efficiency of the VMD
technique to locate system states and capture the high-order
non-sinusoidal spikes in transient signals.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Since the false prediction of events would mislead the
CRASc to take inappropriate actions, we have considered sev-
eral performance measures to evaluate the proposed anomaly
detector 1 of CPADS. Fig. 8 shows the accuracy rate (%)
of several machine learning algorithms, such as support vec-
tor machine (SVM), DT, bayesian network (BN), k-nearest
neighbors (KNN), AdaBoost, and VMD-applied algorithms
(VMD-SVM, VMD-BN, VMD-DT, VMD-KNN, and VMD-
AdaBoost) for M1, M2, and M3 classifiers. Note that we have
tuned the parameters of these machine learning algorithms to
optimize their performances using the 10-fold cross validation.
It can be observed that the proposed VMD-DT algorithm ex-
hibits superior performance with an accuracy rate of 99.856%
for M1, 99.85% for M2, and 99.66% for M3 as compared
to other classifiers. Besides, Fig. 8 presents the significance
of VMD technique as the accuracy of other VMD applied
algorithms has improved at a certain level in most of the
cases. Apart from the accuracy rate, we have also considered
other performance measures, namely average recall, average
precision, and average F-measure to validate the performance
of classifiers. Recall, also known as sensitivity, defines the true
positive rate (TPR), precision measures the positive predictive
value, and F-measure, which provides a balance between
the precision and recall, is calculated based on recall and
precision. These performance measures are calculated using
(15) to (17) where TPi, FNi, and FPi are true positives, false
negatives, and false positives of ith class and K is the total
number of classes. Table II presents a comparison of VMD-
DT with a decision tree (DT) algorithm, where the proposed
VMD-DT algorithm shows a consistent and better performance
for all three models as compared to the DT algorithm with
same datasets.
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SVM VMD-SVM BN VMD-BN VMD-DT* DT KNN VMD-KNN AdaB VMD-AdaB
86.9330 8 . 00 97.5350 98.7218 99.85 0 99.6552 99.3300 99.89 0 94.7328 97.3603
90.5310 9 .9 00 97.7540 99.4800 99.8 0 99.8140 89.8030 9 . 0 90.5240 90.4430
72.1550 8 . 00 91.0100 98.2165 99.660 98.2636 98.9980 98. 0 71.7638 72.7350
Fig. 8: Accuracy plot of classifiers for M1, M2, and M3
TABLE II: Performance metrics for different classifiers
Parameters VMD-DT DT
Model 1 (M1) Performance
Average Recall 0.986 0.982
Average Precision 0.989 0.983
Average F-Measure 0.988 0.982
Model 2 (M2) Performance
Average Recall 0.995 0.991
Average Precision 0.995 0.993
Average F-Measure 0.995 0.992
Model 3 (M3) Performance
Average Recall 0.997 0.984
Average Precision 0.997 0.985
Average F-measure 0.997 0.984
TABLE III: Performance metrics during the stratified k-fold
cross validation
Parameters Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Accuracy (%) 99.8572 99.8773 99.6206
Average Recall 0.9813 0.9962 0.99625
Average Precision 0.9826 0.9968 0.997
Average F-measure 0.982 0.9964 0.9965
A. Stratified cross validation-based evaluation
In this subsection, we present the stratified k-fold cross val-
idation (K=10)-based evaluation of the proposed classification
models. Note that this method performs stratified sampling
of given datasets instead of random sampling to provide the
generalized performance of classifiers. Table III presents the
promising performance of these classifiers with the computed
AR, AP, and AF of around 98.2% for M1, and 99.6% for M2
and M3. Further, the computed accuracy during the stratified
cross validation is above 99.6% for these classifiers while the
model 2 showing the higher accuracy of 99.877%. We have
also computed the receiver operating characteristics (ROC)
to determine the trade-off between true positive rate (TPR),
also known as sensitivity, and false positive rate (FPR) on a
numerical scale. Fig. 9 illustrates the ROC plots of different
classifiers with area under curve (AUC) of each class for the
given classifier. The higher the AUC and closer the apex of the
ROC curve towards the top left corner, as illustrated through
the highlighted zoomed portion, greater the detection ability of
a classifier for the given class. For example, Fig. 9 (a) presents
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(a) ROC plot of M1 classifier.
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(b) ROC plot of M2 classifier.
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(c) ROC plot of M3 classifier.
Fig. 9: ROC of different classifiers during the stratified k-fold
cross validation
the ROC plot of M1 classifier where the ROC curve of class
z2 is further to the top left corner with the computed AUC of
0.999, which shows higher detection ability for events in class
z2 as compared to the remaining two classes.
B. Detection Performance under Noisy Environment
In this approach, a white Gaussian noise is injected in
datasets by varying a signal to noise ratio (SNR) values from
30 dB to 70 dB in a step increase of 5 dB. Note that a
higher value of SNR represents a lower level of noise in PMU
measurements. Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 present the analysis in
terms of average true positive rate (ATPR) and average false
positive rate (AFPR) with an increase in SNR value from
30 dB to 70 dB for VMD-DT and DT algorithms. While
it is intuitive to expect a low accuracy rate during a high
noise level, the proposed VMD-DT algorithm still shows a
consistent performance with 93% ATPR for M1, 98% ATPR
for M2, and 93.8% ATPR for M3 for the lower SNR value
of 30 dB. Unlikely to the high accuracy rate of VMD-DT, the
performance of the DT is gradually degrading with a decrease
in the value of SNR, where the ATPR of DT reduces to 82%
for M1, 53.5% for M2, and 74.7% for M3 for the lower SNR
value of 30 dB, as shown in Fig. 10. Similarly, it is evident
from Fig. 11 that the computed AFPR is always lower than
2% for M1, 0.3% for M2, and 3.5% for M3 for the proposed
VMD-DT algorithm. Note that the main reason behind the
consistent and robust performance of VMD-DT is its close
relationship with a wiener filtering technique that removes
unwanted noises while updating modes.
C. Processing Time
Fig. 12 presents the computational processing time (µs per
PMU frame) of M1, M2, and M3 during testing. We observe
that the average and maximum computational processing time
of DT are 1.7665 µs and 10.049 µs that are almost similar
to the VMD-DT’s processing time, which are 2.4085 µs
and 8.6498 µs. Also, during the real-time data processing of
VMD-DT algorithm for different models, a sliding window
of 300 samples (Ns) is assigned. The computed maximum
computational processing time for total frames is around 2.6
ms, which is much lesser than a time step of incoming
PMU packets (60 frames/sec) that are also further delayed
by processing, concentrators, multiplexing and transducers,
and the combined delay is estimated to be around 75 ms
[37]. Additionally, the communication delay for fiber optics
can be assumed to be about 25 ms [37]. Therefore, we can
consider the total delay of 100-130 ms for incoming PMU
packets. Since the synchrophasor-based CRAS has a timing
requirement of around 200-300 ms [7], [8], the proposed ADS
with a maximum cumulative response time of around 130 ms
does not hamper the regular operation of CRAS.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a machine learning-based
CPADS using a multi-source heterogeneous system data, in-
cluding PMU measurements and network properties, to detect
data integrity and communication failure attacks in CRAS
cyber-physical security. We described the proposed architec-
ture and detection methodology that utilize DT and VMD
algorithms to develop three classification models and final
events identification is performed using a rules-based decision
logic. We also described the rules-based features selection
method and showcased its significance in selecting relevant
features and enhancing the performance of classifiers. For
detailed case studies, we utilized the IEEE 39 bus system and
outlined several steps involved in generating datasets, data-
preprocessing, and training and testing proposed models in
the HIL cyber-physical testbed environment. Our experimental
results showed that the proposed classification models of
CPADS demonstrate better efficiency than other classifiers
and also exhibit consistent performance during noisy PMU
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Fig. 10: Variation of ATPR with SNR for model 1 (a), model 2 (b), and model 3 (c)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 11: Variation of AFPR with SNR for model 1 (a), model 2 (b), and model 3 (c)
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Fig. 12: Processing time (µs) for M1, M2, and M3
measurements. We also analyzed the computational processing
time of these classifiers to make sure that the proposed CPADS
can be integrated seamlessly with the existing CRAS. A
potential avenue for future work is to develop a hybrid CPADS
that combines rules, behavior, and online machine learning
and deep learning-based approaches to enhance the cyberattack
resiliency of CRAS.
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